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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a great honor and pleasure to have the opportunity to discuss new 
work by Michael Risinger as part of this Symposium.1  Like his other 
scholarship on evidence, his article on the emotion of surprise and legal 
standards of proof is creative, enlightening, challenging, and a joy to read.2  
In his characteristic style, he moves across disciplinary boundaries, gathering 
abstract insights about evidence and inference wherever he finds them, while 
also remaining acutely focused on the practical problems of legal proof.  
Risinger’s article, like his work generally, contains some of the most abstract 
of abstract theorizing combined with impressive knowledge of the day-to-
day realities of law and a healthy dose of common sense.3  The article 
concerns the particular legal and moral problem of convicting factually 
innocent criminal defendants (a common theme for Michael); in this 
instance, he approaches the problem through the lens of standards of proof.4 
 
 
 Henry Upson Sims Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.  My thanks to 
Ron Allen for helpful comments and to Dean Mark Brandon and the University of Alabama 
Law School Foundation for generous research support. 
 1  This paper was presented at the Symposium on “Experts, Inference, and Innocence,” 
honoring the work of Michael Risinger, John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall 
University School of Law.  
 2  D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply that We 
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965 
(2018).   
 3  See generally id.   
 4  Id.   
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Risinger proposes a general account of standards of proof based on the 
emotion of “surprise,” focusing in particular on the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” (BARD) standard in criminal cases.5  He supports this account with 
three general claims.  First, he argues that the primary purpose of standards 
of proof is “to define the level of subjective certainty necessary for such a 
decision to be a morally justified decision”.6  To achieve this aim, standards 
of proof function (or ought to function) by “making jurors determine [their] 
degree of belief, and then norming them to understand the degree of belief 
which the law requires for an affirmative finding.”7  Second, he argues that 
the standard decision-theoretic tools for defining standards of proof and 
measuring “degrees of belief” are “ill-suited” for legal proof.8  Instead, his 
“central claim is that people believe something to be true to the extent that 
they would be surprised to find out it was false.”9  Third, he argues that “the 
extent of surprise” is “best revealed” by “asking directly how surprised one 
would be to find out that the thing believed was false.”10  In conveying to 
jurors the level of surprise necessary for a conviction, the BARD standard 
can achieve its primary purpose: “to get the jurors to understand the moral 
burden they bear in the individual case.”11 
 
 
 
 
 5  Id. at 970 (positing that “when humans evaluate evidence and determine what they 
believe in regard to facts, the primary, though usually implicit, operator in those 
determinations is, or at least ought to be, the fundamental emotion of surprise”).  
 6  Id. at 980.  See also id. at 979 (“[S]tandards of proof  . . .  are intended to speak to 
jurors about their level of certainty concerning the material issues of the case they are deciding 
after they have seen the evidence produced at the trial.”).   
 7  Risinger, supra note 2, at 981.  
 8  Risinger, supra note 2, at 968–981.  His critique of this model for standards of proof 
is based on two primary arguments.  First, in defining standards of proof, he argues that 
although various systemic issues (based on the utilities of different outcomes) are inevitable 
consequences of the standards, they are not their primary purpose.  Id. at 979–80.  For this 
reason, he rejects the idea of defining the standards as probabilistic thresholds based on these 
utilities.  Second, he argues that “betting exercises” are a “poor proxy” for measuring 
subjective uncertainty in the context of legal proof.  Id. at 981.  Although her argument is 
framed somewhat differently, the philosopher Lara Buchak has argued along similar lines: 
“credences” (or degrees of belief, as measured by rational betting behavior) are, she claims, 
responsive to different features of evidence than beliefs and norms about moral blame.  See 
Lara Buchak, Belief, Credence, and Norms, 169 PHIL. STUD. 285 (2014).   
 9  Risinger, supra note 2, at 981.  
 10  Risinger, supra note 2, at 981.  Risinger proposes a system of “estimative surprise” to 
rank-order the level of surprise: “mildly surprised, surprised, quite surprised, greatly 
surprised, astonished, shocked, etc.”  Id. at 982.  He also notes that “[t]he opposite of surprise 
is expectation.”  Id. at 970 n.17.   
 11  Id. at 980 n.47.  Risinger qualifies the theory by noting that the surprise framework 
may not map as clearly onto evaluate issues (e.g., reasonableness) decided by juries as it does 
for more purely factual disputes.  Id. at 985–88.   
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My discussion will focus on epistemological issues underlying the 
surprise theory.  I will first discuss some general methodological issues and 
then focus on two specific considerations: epistemic safety and explanations.  
I will argue that each consideration grounds the underlying epistemic 
question of how surprised jurors ought to be in light of the evidence.  The 
safer the verdict, the more surprised jurors ought to be if their finding turned 
out to be false.  Similarly, the better an explanation of the evidence, the more 
likely jurors should be surprised if the explanation turned out to be false.  A 
corollary of this is that jurors should be very surprised when there is no 
plausible explanation that would imply that their factual finding is false.  I 
conclude by discussing two case examples that illustrate how these 
considerations of safety and explanations relate to Risinger’s proposed 
theory. 
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF PROOF STANDARDS 
Standards of proof have both psychological and epistemic aspects.  The 
psychological aspects concern various descriptive issues about what legal 
actors do and think in the context of legal fact finding.  For example, how do 
jurors process and evaluate evidence?  What do they understand the 
standards of proof to mean?  And what criteria do they use in determining 
whether a standard of proof has been satisfied?  Successful answers to these 
questions will involve accurate descriptions and explanations of how legal 
fact finders believe, reason, and decide as they do.12  By contrast, the 
epistemic aspects have a normative or evaluative component.  The epistemic 
aspects are concerned with what jurors ought to believe, and how they ought 
to reason and decide based on the evidence and the standard of proof.13  They 
are also concerned with whether particular jury findings are “reasonable” or 
“rational” in light of the evidence.14 
 
 
 
 
 12  See generally MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (2016).   
 13  See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY 31 (2006); Susan Haack, Legal Probabilism: An Epistemological Dissent, in 
EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 47 (2014).   
 14  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (explaining the 
sufficiency standard for criminal convictions depends on whether “any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”).  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56; FED. R. CIV. P. 50; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 
(2000) (explaining that the standard for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the summary 
judgment standard); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (explaining 
that summary judgment depends on whether “reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance 
of the evidence” for the non-moving party).   
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The distinction between these two aspects is intuitive but is also subject 
to a number of possible confusions.  One source of possible confusion 
concerns the relationship between the psychological and epistemic aspects.  
There is not—and need not be—any sharp division between the two 
categories.  The epistemology at issue in legal proof generally, and with 
standards of proof in particular, is “naturalized” in the sense that 
psychological evidence is both relevant for epistemic theorizing and also 
potentially constraining.15  It is relevant for evaluating the extent to which 
the psychological processes of fact finders match what they ought to be, and 
for identifying areas in need of improvement or ways to improve decision-
making.16  It is also potentially constraining by identifying realistic limits 
that any normative theorizing must take into account (in other words, “ought 
implies can”).17  A second potential source of confusion follows from the 
fact that some of the demands placed on “knowledge” and “beliefs” in 
epistemology may be irrelevant for legal fact finding because, for example, 
they are too demanding for what can be expected of legal decision-makers.18  
Even if the context of the trial makes some epistemic requirements 
inapplicable, however, this does not mean that epistemic evaluations cannot 
be made—practices may be better or worse at arriving at the truth, some 
types of evidence are better than others, and factual findings will be more or 
less justified based on the evidence. 
The connections between these general reflections and Risinger’s 
theory are hopefully clear.  The “surprise” theory is primarily a 
psychological account of standards of proof.  The account depends on 
identifying a particular mental state of the fact finder—i.e., their subjective 
level of “surprise”—and assessing it against the level of subjective certainty 
associated with the applicable standard of proof.  In this sense, the surprise 
model is similar to subjective probability models of proof, except for 
replacing one subjective criterion with another.  Subjective mental states, 
however, are not by themselves sufficient to adequately account for 
standards of proof.  What is missing is some account of the epistemic aspects.  
In other words, rather than examining, based on the evidence, how surprised 
the fact finder would be (and whether this is enough to meet the standard of 
proof), the epistemic question is how surprised should the fact finder be? 
 
 
 15  See Hilary Kornblith, What is Naturalistic Epistemology?, in NATURALIZING 
EPISTEMOLOGY 14 (Hilary Kornblith ed., 2d ed. 1994); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, 
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001).   
 16  Kornblith, supra note 15.   
 17  See Allen & Leiter, supra note 15, at 1503.   
 18  For discussion of these issues, see Michael S. Pardo, The Gettier Problem and Legal 
Proof, 16 LEGAL THEORY 37 (2010).   
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Risinger, of course, recognizes this and accordingly he mentions the 
need to provide the jury with “norms” on applying the standards.19  It is 
important, however, to distinguish two different types of normative 
considerations that might apply in this context.  One sense—what I will call 
“weak” norms—concerns informing jurors about the appropriate level of 
surprise required for each standard and aligning outcomes so that subjective 
degrees of belief (measured by surprise) match the standards’ requirements20  
Risinger’s discussion of “norming” in the paper appears to focus on this 
weaker sense.21  A second sense—what I will call “strong” norms—concerns 
whether fact finders’ subjective assessments are epistemically warranted.  
This stronger sense is less concerned with the subjective mental states of fact 
finders; instead, it is concerned with what those subjective mental states 
should be.  In other words, it is not about how surprised they would be if 
their finding turned out to be false, but about how surprised they should be.  
Any theory of standards of proof also needs to account for these epistemic 
aspects—the policy goals underlying the rules and legal doctrine require it.22 
The next Part discusses two epistemic considerations that will help 
flesh out the epistemic aspects to standards of proof defined in terms of 
surprise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19  As I understand it, the surprise criterion is meant to capture a necessary condition, not 
a sufficient one.  See Risinger, supra note 2, at 980 (referring to “the level of subjective 
certainty necessary for [a verdict] to be a morally justified decision”).   
 20  In a sense, this type of weak normative constraint is similar to the consistency 
constraints in subjective probability theory.  Although they help to maintain consistency 
among subjective beliefs, they need not have any necessary connection with the truth of those 
beliefs.  See Alvin I. Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 237, 239 (2002) (“[S]ubjective Bayesianism does not commend itself as a 
basis for truth acquisition.”).  Similarly, properly matching subjective levels of surprise with 
the subjective level associated with each standard need not have any necessary connection 
with accuracy, unless subjective states of surprise are constrained by, or otherwise reliably 
track, objective features in the world.   
 21  See Risinger, supra note 2, at 982 (“What is needed is a way of norming jurors into 
reasonably consistent designations in the use of the scale.”).   
 22  See supra note 14.  The policy goals concern overall systemic consequences regarding 
accuracy and the risk of error.  See Risinger, supra note 2, at 979–80.   
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III. SAFETY AND EXPLANATIONS 
According to the surprise framework, the level of surprise necessary for 
a verdict should rise as the standard of proof rises.23  For the most demanding 
standard—BARD—the jury should only convict when they would be very 
surprised (“shocked”) if it turned out the defendant is innocent.24  In turning 
the question around to its epistemic side, the issue becomes when jurors 
should be so surprised.  In discussing this issue, I focus on two considerations 
that should affect estimates of surprise.  The first concerns the epistemic 
safety of factual findings, and the second concerns the competing possible 
explanations of the evidence and events.  Each affects the extent to which 
jurors should be surprised if a factual finding turns out to be false. 
The concept of epistemic safety is a modal notion that arises in 
epistemological discussions of knowledge.25  Specifically, safety has been 
proposed as a condition for true beliefs to qualify as knowledge.26  For 
example, suppose I believe that “the cat is on the mat” (and that this belief is 
true).  If I could easily be mistaken about this, then my belief is unsafe.  If I 
could not easily be mistaken, then my belief is safe.  Philosophers typically 
articulate safety conditions in terms of whether there are close “possible 
worlds” in which the agent forms the same belief and the belief is false.27  
For example, if there are close possibilities in which I mistakenly believe 
that the cat is on the mat, then my belief is unsafe. 
 
 
 23  Risinger, supra note 2, at 984.   
 24  Risinger, supra note 2, at 984.  (“Even simply the use of the terms of estimative 
surprise, like ‘shocked’ for a description of reasonable doubt, might do.”).   
 25  Ernest Sosa, How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, 13 PHIL. PERSPS. 141, 142 (1999) 
(“S would believe that p only if it were so that p.”).  See also Duncan Pritchard, Safety, 
Sensitivity, and Anti-Luck Epistemology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SKEPTICISM (John 
Greco ed., 2008).   
 26  Pritchard, supra note 25; Sosa, supra note 25.  Risinger explored a related notion of 
safety in prior work, see D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed 
Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 
1332 (2004), which draws on the “unsafe verdict” standard for reviewing criminal convictions 
in the UK.  See CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT 1995, c. 35, § 2 (UK).  As I understand it, the concept 
of epistemic safety is narrower than Risinger’s proposed standard or the UK standard.  In 
other words, a lack of epistemic safety may be one reason why a verdict is unsafe under either 
of the latter.  
 27  John Greco, Better Safe than Sensitive, in THE SENSITIVITY PRINCIPLE IN 
EPISTEMOLOGY 193, 194–95 (Kelly Becker & Tim Black eds., 2012) (“The spirit of a safety 
condition is that, in cases of knowledge, S would not easily go wrong by believing as she 
does . . . . S’s belief that p is safe just in case: there are no close worlds where both S believes 
that p, and p is false.”).  In this discussion, I am putting aside the complex philosophical issues 
regarding possible worlds and how best to measure similarity.  On possible worlds generally, 
see JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (2002); DAVID K. LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS 
(1986); Christopher Menzel, Possible Worlds, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/. 
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Within epistemology, a lot depends on how exactly “close” is 
determined and how other details are specified.28  Many details of these 
debates are not important for purposes of legal evidence and proof, but two 
details are significant.  First, closeness will depend on how much would have 
to change or be different for beliefs to be true or false.29  This will be a matter 
of degree.  Second, safety essentially concerns the reliability of inferences in 
close possible worlds.30  This, too, will be a matter of degree. 
These details suggest how epistemic safety maps onto legal proof and 
also, I contend, the notion of surprise.  Epistemic safety concerns the 
reliability of findings in close possible worlds.  In the context of the trial, the 
issue is how easily the jury could, based on the evidence, find the defendant 
guilty and be mistaken.  The more difficult it is for this to occur, the safer 
the verdict; the easier it is, the more unsafe.  My suggestion is that the level 
of surprise should track the degree of epistemic safety.  We should be more 
surprised to learn that a verdict is mistaken when it is safe than when it is 
unsafe. 
In fleshing out this suggestion, we need some concept or criteria for 
determining “how easily” a jury’s guilty verdict could be mistaken.  One 
possibility is to focus on the “modal proximity” of an erroneous factual 
finding.31  This conception is related to but distinct from a conception based 
on probability (i.e., the probability of an erroneous finding).32  A 
probabilistically unlikely event may nevertheless be an “easy” modal 
possibility.  The philosopher Duncan Pritchard discusses the example of 
lotteries in order to distinguish the two conceptions.  He contrasts them with 
the following thought experiment: 
 
 
 28  These issues and their potential relevance for legal proof are discussed in more detail 
in Michael S. Pardo, Safety vs. Sensitivity: Possible Worlds and the Law of Evidence, 24 
LEGAL THEORY 1 (2018), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/safe
ty-vs-sensitivity-possible-worlds-and-the-law-of-
evidence/DEEA205B0A31A5582D370A735A25B1F3.  
 29  For an excellent overview in the context of constitutional theory, see Lawrence B. 
Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 316–20 (2008). 
 30  See Greco, supra note 27, at 193 (“[S]afety just is reliability throughout a space of 
close counterfactual situations.”).  Reliability in general and in close possible worlds may 
diverge.  See David Manley, Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge, 104 J. PHIL. 403, 409 
(2007) (“My ability to discriminate larks from other birds may be so reliable that there are 
only five token birds in the world that I would mistake for larks.  But if all five of them happen 
to be in my yard along with a real lark, that is enough to undermine my knowledge.”).   
 31  Duncan Pritchard, Risk, 46 METAPHILOSOPHY 436, 447, 452–57 (2015).  
 32  Id. at 449 (“[T]he modal ordering of possible worlds in terms of similarity is often 
closely aligned with the probabilities of the events in question, such that low-probability 
events tend to be concerned with far-off possible worlds, and high-probability events tend to 
be concerned with close possible worlds.  Appeals to probability can thus remain as a general 
guide to assessing risk.  The point is just that this cannot be the full story[.]”).   
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Case 1: An evil scientist has rigged up a large bomb . . . The bomb 
will only detonate, however, if a certain set of numbers comes up 
on the next national lottery draw.  The odds of these numbers 
appearing is fourteen million to one.  It is not possible to interfere 
with this lottery draw.33 
 
Case 2: An evil scientist has rigged up a large bomb . . . The bomb 
will only detonate, however, if a series of three highly unlikely 
events obtains.  First, the weakest horse in the field at the Grand 
National, Lucky Loser, must win the race by at least ten furlongs.  
Second, the worst team remaining in the FA Cup draw, 
Accrington Stanley, must beat the best team remaining, 
Manchester United, by at least ten goals.  And third, the queen of 
England must spontaneously choose to speak a complete sentence 
of Polish during her next public speech.  The odds of this chain of 
events occurring are fourteen million to one.  It is not possible to 
interfere with the outcomes of any of the events in this chain.34 
 
Pritchard argues that there is a much higher level of risk in Case 1 than 
2, despite identical probabilities.35  In Case 1, “even despite the odds 
involved, the bomb blast is nonetheless something that could very easily 
occur.”36  All it would take is “for a few coloured balls . . . to fall in a certain 
configuration.”37  By contrast, Case 2 could not so easily occur.38  Each 
event, while possible, “is incredibly far-fetched” and “would require an 
incredible run of events.”39  “[S]tranger things have happened” but the bomb 
going off in Case 2 “is not something that could very easily occur,” unlike 
in Case 1.40  Pritchard extends this distinction to legal proof by modeling 
wrongful criminal convictions based on the two types of cases.  On one hand, 
we can imagine a “lottery-style” wrongful conviction similar to Case 1.  For 
example, he gives a stylized DNA example in which the chance that a sample 
belongs to anyone other than the defendant is also fourteen million to one.41  
 
 33  Id. at 441.   
 34  Id.   
 35  Id. at 442.   
 36  Id.   
 37  Pritchard, supra note 31, at 442.   
 38  Id.   
 39  Id.   
 40  Id.   
 41  Id. at 455.  The example assumes this is the primary prosecution evidence and 
stipulates (1) there is no room for error in collection or analysis of the sample, and (2) the 
sample belonging to someone else is “a modally close possibility, in that not much would 
need to be different about the actual world for this fourteen-million-to-one event to obtain.”  
Id.   
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On the other hand, we can imagine an equally unlikely wrongful conviction, 
but one that does not occur as easily.  Perhaps two independent eyewitnesses 
misidentify the defendant; the defendant’s DNA is found at the scene but 
was there for a non-inculpatory reason (he used to work in the building);42 
and potentially exonerating alibi evidence is inadvertently destroyed 
(through no fault of the prosecution or the defense).  The defendants in both 
cases were unlucky, but they were unlucky in very different ways. 
This modal account of the risk of erroneous factual findings fits well 
with Risinger’s surprise framework.43  Under this account, the key issue 
concerns what would have to have gone wrong, and in what ways, for the 
jury’s verdict to be erroneous?44  Answering this question will tell us 
something about how surprised jurors ought to be if their findings turned out 
to be false.  We are, in a sense, “surprised” if a particular set of lottery 
numbers comes up, given the unlikely odds.45  But, in another sense, we 
aren’t nearly as “surprised” as when an incredible series of unlikely events 
all occur.46  Apart from the probabilities, it does seem to be the case that 
events that could not easily occur (unlike the lottery) are more surprising, 
and are more surprising for that reason. 
I turn now to the second consideration relevant for surprise: 
explanations.  According to the general theory of proof that Ron Allen and I 
have developed, standards of proof are best explained in terms of explanatory 
thresholds.47  Like Risinger, we therefore reject defining standards of proof 
as probabilistic thresholds.  According to the explanatory account, the proof 
process involves two stages: (1) the generation of potential explanations of 
the evidence and events, and (2) a comparison of the explanations in light of 
the applicable standard of proof.  In general, the process depends on the 
parties to obtain evidence and to offer what they consider to be the best 
explanation (or explanations) that support their respective cases.  Fact 
 
 42  For examples, see ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC 
DNA 33 (2015).   
 43  See Pritchard, supra note 31, at 449.   
 44  In other words, we should want wrongful convictions that do (and inevitably will) 
occur to be not only unlikely, but also ones that could not occur very easily. 
 45  This surprise, of course, is often offset by the realization that some set of numbers had 
to come up and this set was just as likely as any other. 
 46  Personally, I will note that my surprise (“shock,” even) at the Chicago Cubs winning 
the 2016 World Series far exceeded the probabilistic odds (under any conception of 
probability). 
 47  See Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 
LAW & PHIL. 223 (2008), which builds on Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory 
of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 606 (1994).  Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical 
Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1991).  We expand on the account and address various 
criticisms in detail in Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, 
(Univ. of Ala. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3179601, 2018).   
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finders, however, may also develop and rely upon explanations other than 
those advanced by the parties.  Whether a party’s explanation is sufficient 
will depend on the standard of proof. 
The explanatory thresholds vary depending on the standard—with 
higher standards requiring a higher threshold.48  Under the “preponderance 
of the evidence” standard, fact finders determine whether the best of the 
available explanations favors the plaintiff or the defendant.49  The best 
available explanation will favor the plaintiff if it includes all of the legal 
elements of the plaintiff’s claim; it will favor the defendant when it fails to 
include one or more elements.50  A number of general criteria affect the 
strength or quality of an explanation.51  These criteria include considerations 
such as: consistency, coherence, fit with background knowledge, simplicity, 
absence of gaps, and the number of unlikely assumptions that need to be 
made.52  Higher standards require more from the party with the burden of 
proof.  In criminal cases, under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, 
the prosecution must do more than present a better explanation than the 
defense (or the best available explanation): fact finders should convict only 
when the prosecution’s explanation (which includes all of the legal elements) 
is plausible, given the evidence, and there is no plausible defense 
 
 48  In this respect, they are similar to the probabilistic account of the standards. 
 49  See, e.g., Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521–22 (7th Cir. 2005) (comparing 
explanations); Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(same); Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). 
 50  An explanation will “include” an element if the element is a part of, or is entailed by 
the explanation.  For example, in a negligence case, the plaintiff’s explanation must include 
each of the elements; if the better explanation fails to include an element (e.g., causation), 
then the defendant will win.   
 51  These general criteria affect the quality of explanations in a wide variety of contexts 
such as science, history, and everyday common sense reasoning.  See PETER ACHINSTEIN, THE 
NATURE OF EXPLANATION (1983); GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF 
REASONING 65–75 (1986); PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, HOW WE REASON 186–88 (2006) 
(discussing the role of explanations in reasoning); PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST 
EXPLANATION (2d ed. 2004); Tania Lombrozo, Explanation and Abductive Inference, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 260 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. 
Morrison eds., 2012).  
 52  In general, the quality of an explanation serves as a proxy for likelihood: the better the 
explanation, the more likely, when compared with the available alternatives.  LIPTON, supra 
note 51, at 119; Timothy Williamson, Abductive Philosophy, 47 PHIL. FORUM 263, 267 (2016) 
(“Inference to the best explanation does not directly rank potential explanations according to 
their probability.  This does not . . . make it inconsistent with a probabilistic 
epistemology[.] . . . [It] may be a good heuristic to use when—as often happens—
probabilities are hard to estimate[.]”).  See also Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“[I]f in a particular case all the alternatives are ruled out, we can be confident that 
the case presents one of those [rare] instances in which the rare event did occur.”); United 
States v. Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Relative to the alternatives, the 
government’s case was more powerful than it would have seemed in the abstract.”).   
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explanation.53 
This explanatory threshold—i.e., that the jury should convict if and 
only if the only plausible explanation(s) favors the prosecution—is a natural 
fit with Risinger’s surprise framework.54  At the very least they are fellow 
travelers.  Here is why:  when there is a plausible explanation available to 
jurors (presented by the defendant or constructed by themselves) in which 
the defendant is innocent, then jurors should not be very surprised to learn 
the defendant is not guilty.  Under both accounts, a conviction is not 
warranted.  On the other hand, when the only plausible explanations of what 
happened support the prosecution’s case—i.e., no plausible alternatives have 
been presented or can be constructed—then jurors should be surprised, and 
likely would be surprised, to learn the defendant is not guilty.  Moreover, to 
the extent explanatory considerations are a proxy for likelihood of truth, and 
explanatory considerations similarly track surprise, then explanations 
provide a link between the surprise framework and the traditional systemic 
considerations (accuracy and the risk of error) underlying standards of 
proof.55  In this way, the explanatory framework may bring the psychology 
of surprise in line with the epistemology of proof. 
Finally, it should be noted that the two considerations—safety and 
explanations—are related.  When fact finders compare and evaluate 
alternative explanations of the evidence and events, considerations of 
epistemic safety affect the process.  When the inferences from evidence are 
safe, the evidence is better in distinguishing between the different factual 
possibilities.56  When the inferences are unsafe, the evidence is consistent 
with different close possibilities (e.g., guilt and innocence).  The more 
unsafe, the less likely the evidence distinguishes between these 
possibilities.57  When the inferences are safe, the evidence is better at ruling 
out the false alternatives.  Safe evidence is thus better evidence precisely 
because it better supports one explanation (over its alternatives) in close 
possible worlds.  In such circumstances, we should be more surprised to learn 
that a chosen explanation (leading to a guilty verdict) turned out to be false.  
In the next Part, I illustrate these abstract reflections on safety, explanation, 
 
 53  Pardo & Allen, supra note 47.  
 54  See Risinger, supra note 2, at 984.  
 55  For example, if one aim of the preponderance standard is to favor whichever side’s 
factual theory is more likely to be true, and better explanations are more likely to be true than 
worse ones, then favoring the better of the available explanations will serve as a proxy for 
which theory is more likely to be true.  Surprise fits naturally into this picture.  Jurors should 
be more surprised to learn the better explanation is false than to learn the worse explanation 
is false, and therefore they should favor the former.  Similar considerations apply, with 
necessary adjustments, for higher standards aimed at skewing the risk of error in a particular 
direction.   
 56  See Pardo, supra note 28 (discussing this issue).  
 57  Accordingly, safety affects the probative value of evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 403.  
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and surprise with two examples. 
IV. TWO EXAMPLES 
I conclude by discussing two cases in which defendants were convicted 
and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against them.  Both cases 
raised the same doctrinal question: whether, based on the evidence, a rational 
jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.58  The 
examples are instructive for illustrating the epistemic aspects of the BARD 
standard because they both involve reviewing courts that articulate why the 
evidence is or is not sufficient to warrant a conviction.  The examples fall on 
either side of the line in answering this question. 
The first example, O’Laughlin v. O’Brien, involved a conviction for 
burglary and assault.59  The victim, Annmarie Kotowski, was found 
“severely beaten and covered in blood” in her apartment; an expert testified 
that she suffered approximately fifteen to twenty blows to her face (breaking 
nearly every bone in her face and skull) and that she had defense wounds on 
her hands from five to ten blows.60  Kotowski lived alone in her apartment 
and could not remember any details of the attack or her assailant.61  The 
defendant, Michael O’Laughlin, a member of the apartment complex’s 
maintenance staff, lived two doors down from the victim.62 
The attack apparently occurred late at night or early in the morning.63  
A neighbor called 911 at 2:00 AM to report a woman screaming and what 
sounded like “wood hitting wood.”64  But when police arrived shortly after 
they apparently could not locate the apartment from where the reported 
screams were coming.65  They did, however, see the defendant walking on a 
pathway outside of his apartment, wearing only boxer shorts.66  He said that 
he heard screaming but thought that it was a raccoon trapped in a dumpster; 
he went out to prop the dumpster open with a stick.67  The police confirmed 
the stick in the dumpster, searched the area further, and then left after noting 
nothing else suspicious.68  Kotowski was found at 5:45 AM by her boyfriend, 
 
 58  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (establishing this sufficiency standard 
as a constitutional right required by due process).   
 59  568 F.3d 287 (1st Cir. 2009).  
 60  Id. at 289–95 (summarizing the facts).  
 61  Id. at 289–90.  
 62  Id. at 290.  
 63  See id. at 289–90 
 64  Id. at 291.   
 65  O’Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 291.   
 66  Id.   
 67  Id. The defendant’s supervisor testified that the apartment complex had been having 
problems with raccoons getting trapped in the dumpster.  Id. at 291 n.5.  
 68  Id. at 291.   
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who arrived to have coffee with her.69 
The prosecution’s theory was that O’Laughlin, desperate for drug 
money, entered Kotowski’s apartment searching for cash or valuables and 
attacked her in the process.70  According to the evidence presented at trial, 
on the night of the attack O’Laughlin had smoked crack cocaine at the home 
of a friend, and when he returned to his apartment he apparently tried several 
times to call “known drug dealers.”71  As a member of the maintenance staff, 
he possessed a key to Kotowski’s apartment and had once fixed a window in 
her apartment.72  In addition, there was testimony that he once remarked that 
she had expensive furniture and that she was “his type.”  There were no 
eyewitnesses to the attack, and no forensic evidence linked O’Laughlin to 
the attack.73  The prosecution’s additional evidence included a metal baseball 
bat with the defendant’s name on it found in the woods near the apartment 
complex, a small cut on the defendant’s face, and demeanor and other 
“consciousness of guilt” evidence concerning his reactions and behavior 
following interactions with the police.74  The defendant denied involvement 
and at trial also argued that Kotowski’s husband was the attacker.75  She had 
moved to the apartment a couple of months earlier after informing her 
 
 69  Id. at 292.  Kotowski was married but had moved out of her house and into the 
apartment months earlier, after informing her husband that she was having an affair with a 
man named Finn.  Id. at 290.  Finn is the boyfriend who discovered her and called 911.  Id. at 
292.   
 70  Id. at 291 (“As the night wore on, O’Laughlin was ‘depleted of drugs and most of his 
cash.’”).   
 71  O’Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 291.   
 72  Id. at 290 n.2.  There did not appear to be any evidence of forced entry, however, the 
court also noted that several other employees of the apartment complex also had a key.  Id. at 
302.   
 73  Id. at 306.  Fourteen sets of fingerprints were found in Kotowski’s apartment; none 
matched O’Laughlin.  Id. at 294.  Footprint impressions taken in the apartment failed to match 
the defendant’s boots.  Id.  The police searched O’Laughlin’s apartment on two occasions and 
did not find any blood that matched Kotowski.  Id. at 294, 304.  An aluminum baseball bat, 
with O’Laughlin’s name on it, was found in the woods outside the complex.  Id. at 294.  A 
small stain on the handle was determined to be blood: “A state police DNA analyst concluded 
that while Mrs. Kotowski could not be excluded as a contributor, one in two of any randomly 
selected individuals could have been the contributor.”  Id. at 294.   
 74  O’Laughlin stated that he owned the bat but did not see it since moving into the 
apartment.  O’Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 294.  Police testified that they could not tell whether the 
cut was fresh or not; O’Laughlin said it was a pimple.  Id. at n.9.  The consciousness of guilt 
evidence consisted primarily of his demeanor (“uneasy and distant”) and the fact that after 
initially consenting to a search of his apartment, he asked the officers to leave.  Id. at 291, 
293.  When they informed him later that morning of their intent to secure a warrant, he 
eventually consented to a second search.  Id. at 293.  His explanation for asking them to leave 
the first time was his fear that they would take his drug paraphernalia and cash.  Id.  In 
addition, there was testimony that in between the searches he cleaned a small red-ish stain 
that police observed the first time and thought might be blood.  Id.   
 75  O’Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 297 n.13.   
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husband that she was having an affair (with the boyfriend who discovered 
Kotowski after the attack).76  Apparently, she and her husband had discussed 
divorce for the first time a week before the attack.77  After a nine-day trial, 
O’Laughlin was convicted and sentenced to thirty-five to fifty years 
imprisonment.78 
In concluding the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, 
the U.S. Court of the Appeals for the First Circuit focused explicitly on the 
plausibility of the prosecution’s explanation.79  The court reasoned that the 
prosecution’s explanation for what occurred made no sense in light of the 
evidence.80  This was so for two reasons.  First, the prosecution’s account of 
the defendant’s motives and behavior was inconsistent with the evidence.81  
The prosecution argued that the defendant entered the apartment to steal 
money or valuables, but nothing was taken from the apartment.82  Kotowski’s 
purse (which contained cash, credit cards, and a checkbook) was on the floor 
in plain sight in the bedroom where the attack took place; several items of 
jewelry and “an expensive watch” were also in plain sight on the dresser; no 
drawers or cabinets were opened (including a drawer containing over $500 
in cash); and nothing else appeared to be disturbed (other than a damaged 
headboard in the bedroom, from the attack).83  The court explained that this 
evidence was inconsistent with the “drug money” theory and fit instead with 
the explanation that the attack was a personal one directed at the victim 
(either by the husband or someone else).84  Second, the court also explained 
 
 76  Id. at 290.   
 77  Id. at n.1.  There was also evidence about the husband being “verbally abusive” and 
“upset” about the divorce.  Id. at 297 n.13.  As well as evidence that he owned several wooden 
baseball bats.  Id.  The boyfriend was ruled out by the police as a possible suspect and there 
does not appear to have been any indication from the defense that this was a possibility worth 
advancing.  Id. at 292.   
 78  O’Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 289.  The defendant was convicted of four separate counts: 
“(1) burglary and armed assault in a dwelling; (2) armed assault in a dwelling; (3) armed 
assault with intent to murder; and (4) assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.”  
Id. at 295.  The sentence was for concurrent terms of 35–50 years on counts (1) and (2); 19–
20 years on count (3); and 9–10 years on count (4).  Id. at 289.   
 79  Id. at 301.  The issue was before the court on habeas review.  Id. at 290.  In addition 
to holding the evidence to be insufficient under the Jackson standard, the court also held that 
the state court’s application of the Jackson standard was “objectively unreasonable.”  Id. at 
308.   
 80  O’Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 308.   
 81  Id. at 302 (“[T]he evidence that O’Laughlin acted upon a financial motive to commit 
the attack is weak at best.”).   
 82  See id. at 296.   
 83  Id. at 292.   
 84  Id. at 302 (“[T]he assailant’s actions are inconsistent with O’Laughlin’s purported 
financial motive in view of the savage beating Mrs. Kotowski suffered at the hands of the 
assailant, an attack involving at least fifteen to twenty blows that nearly broke every bone in 
her face and skull.  If the assailant were motivated by money, a few blows to incapacitate her 
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that the failure of any forensic evidence to implicate the defendant was 
significant, given the brutality of the attack and the amount of blood.85 
The O’Laughlin case fits with each of the considerations discussed 
above.  Not only is there a plausible explanation supporting the defendant’s 
innocence (i.e., the husband), the prosecution’s explanation fails on its face 
to account for several undisputed items of evidence.86  Moreover, the jury’s 
finding was unsafe: there is at least one close possibility in which the finding 
is false (i.e., the husband theory), and the evidence would have been the same 
in other close possibilities in which someone other than O’Laughlin 
committed the attack.  Accordingly, we (and the jurors) should not be very 
surprised to learn that someone other than O’Laughlin attacked Kotowski. 
The second example, United States v. Beard, involved a defendant 
convicted of carrying a gun during and in relation to a drug offense.87  
According to the evidence, police acting on an informant’s tip staked out a 
parking lot and saw two cars park next to each other.88  Beard got out of one 
car, entered the other, remained there for a few minutes, and then returned to 
his car.89  Both cars were then stopped by the police as they drove off.90  In 
the car in which Beard was riding, they found drugs in a secret compartment 
behind the rear seat and a loaded derringer in the center console of the front 
seat, hidden under some papers.91  They found cash in the other car.92  Neither 
the driver nor Beard owned the car he was riding in; Beard had borrowed it 
eight months earlier and had been seen driving it.93 
 
 
 
 
 
would have been sufficient.”).   
 85  Id. at 304 (“It bears repeating that the prosecution had to rely on circumstantial 
evidence because no physical or DNA evidence linked O’Laughlin to the attack despite the 
copious amount of blood at the crime scene.  Considering the large amount of blood, it is 
difficult to fathom how O’Laughlin was able to avoid having any blood or other DNA 
evidence connect him to Mrs. Kotowski.”).   
 86  See generally O’Laughlin, 568 F.3d 289.  The primary factor that makes this a difficult 
case is the deference given to jury findings when there is some evidence supporting the 
prosecution’s explanation.  The court stated that the prosecution’s explanation was at most a 
“reasonable speculation”.  Id. at 302.  But even this seems generous.   
 87  354 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2004).   
 88  Id. at 691–93 (summarizing the facts).   
 89  Beard was a passenger in the car.  Id. at 692.  Neither side argued that the driver was 
involved in the drug deal or possessed the gun.  See generally id.   
 90  Id. at 692.   
 91  Id.   
 92  Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 2004).   
 93  Id.  
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The key question for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
was whether this evidence was sufficient, under the Jackson standard,94 to 
support a finding that the gun belonged to Beard.95  As the court explained: 
 
No one supposes that the derringer was the property of the car’s 
owner—that she hid a loaded gun in the center console when she 
lent Beard the car.  Since others besides himself used the car 
during the eight months that he possessed it, conceivably the gun 
was left there by one of these users, but it is highly unlikely.  It 
would mean that someone who borrowed the car from Beard 
placed a loaded gun in the console, covered it with papers to 
conceal it, and then—what?  Forgot about it?  That is possible, but 
it was not so lively a possibility as to compel a reasonable jury to 
acquit Beard.96 
 
The court further examined the possibility of alternative plausible 
explanations and noted that none were forthcoming from the defense or 
otherwise available.97  The strength of the prosecution’s explanation—i.e. 
that the gun belonged to Beard—would be undermined by any plausible 
alternatives and is strengthened by the fact that there were no others: “[t]his 
left the jury with no alternative theory to the government’s.  Relative to the 
alternatives, the government’s case was more powerful than it would have 
seemed in the abstract.”98 
Similar to O’Laughlin, the Beard case illustrates the comparative nature 
of proof and the importance of explanations.  By itself, the prosecution’s 
explanation and argument is plausible but not overwhelming.99  What about 
the alternatives?  There are possibilities that could be constructed that are 
consistent with innocence, but there does not appear to be any evidence or 
 
 94  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979).   
 95  Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The difficult question is whether the gun 
was his.”).   
 96  Id.   
 97  Id. (“We asked his lawyer at argument what the explanation of the defense was for the 
presence of the gun in the car that Beard had borrowed.  No answer was forthcoming.  The 
lawyer seems to have thought that since the government had the burden of proof and Beard 
was privileged not to testify (and he did not testify), it was irrelevant that the jury was given 
no alternative to the government’s straightforward theory as to whose gun it was.  That is 
incorrect.”).   
 98  Id. at 693.  The evidence and arguments in Beard are modeled formally in Floris Bex 
& Douglas Walton, Burdens and Standards of Proof for Inference to the Best Explanation: 
Three Case Studies, 11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 113 (2012).   
 99  Bex & Walton, supra note 98, at 126 (arguing that the prosecution’s case viewed by 
itself is “a fairly weak one” but that “there doesn’t seem to be any evidence supporting the 
conclusion that some other person left a gun in the console.  The argument on the other side 
appears to be non-existent.”).  
PARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:07 PM 
2018] AN ESSAY ON RISINGER’S “SURPRISE” THEORY 1055 
arguments that make any of these possibilities seem plausible.100  The court’s 
conclusion therefore fits with the explanatory account of proof: the only 
plausible explanation available is the one in which the gun is the defendant’s.  
Moreover, this finding, although not demonstrably correct (“stranger things 
have happened”), appears to be an epistemically safe one in the sense 
discussed above.  No close possibilities in which the defendant is innocent 
were presented or are otherwise available.101  Therefore, we (and the jurors) 
should be very surprised to learn that the gun did not belong to Beard, more 
so than if we learned that O’Laughlin did not commit the attack. 
 
 
 100  Id.   
 101  It does not seem very easy for an innocent defendant to be convicted based on such 
evidence.  Even in close or similar possible worlds in which someone other than the defendant 
leaves a loaded gun in the car, it would most likely be discovered at some point before the 
arrest.  Thus, safety depends on how easily it could have been the case that (1) someone left 
a loaded gun in the car, and (2) no one discovered or removed it until the police did so. 
